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Background:	   The	   real-­‐time	   evaluation	   (RTE)	   approach	   has	  
been	  applied	   in	  humanitarian	  assistance	   for	   two	  decades.	   Its	  
spread	   seems	   to	   be	   as	   much	   a	   result	   of	   entrepreneurial	  
evaluators	   who	   aim	   to	   demonstrate	   expertise	   to	   potential	  
clients	   as	   it	   is	   a	   response	   to	   actual	   demand	   for	   immediate	  
feedback	  of	  results	  to	  decision	  makers.	  
	  
Purpose:	  As	  RTE	  has	  come	  under	  scrutiny	  recently,	  this	  study	  
demystifies	   the	   concept	   of	   RTE	   and	   looks	   beyond	   textbook	  
descriptions	   of	   its	   advantages	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   its	  






Research	  Design:	  NA	  
	  
Data	  Collection	  and	  Analysis:	  NA	  
	  
Findings:	   It	   then	   suggests	   lessons	   for	   how	   to	   improve	   the	  
application	   of	   real-­‐time	   evaluations	   and	   related	   concepts	   in	  
practice.	  
Keywords:	  real-­‐time	  evaluation;	  humanitarian	  assistance;	  organizational	  learning;	  complexity	  science.	  
 





The concept of real-time evaluation (RTE) has 
evolved and spread considerably since its 
introduction some two decades ago, and since 
reviews first looked comprehensively at its 
application (Herson & Mitchell, 2005; Sandison, 
2006). It has formed an integral part of evaluation 
practice among humanitarian organizations, who 
are continuing to further develop similar 
approaches for immediate evaluative feedback. 
The most recent example is is the case of the 
emerging Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
concept of Real-Time Operational Reviews (see 
also p. 5). These organizations face manifold 
challenges with regard to access to populations, 
lack of quality data, rapidly changing agendas and 
demands from policymakers in a generally chaotic 
(that is, unpredictable) crisis situation. While 
struggling with these challenges, they need to 
show results and the ability to learn if they want to 
sustain support from donors and the wider public 
– and make a difference on the ground. Real-time 
evaluation should support them in this difficult 
task. 
However, the spread of “real-time” approaches 
seems to be as much a result of entrepreneurial 
evaluators who aim to demonstrate expertise and 
innovation to potential clients as it is a response to 
actual demand. Today, RTE is often presented as 
the newest and sharpest tool in the evaluator’s 
toolbox. This article will first turn to broader 
trends in evaluation theory and debate, such as 
evaluation under complexity and its potential to 
stimulate organizational learning, to help 
understand where real-time evaluation came from 
and why it is so popular. Our study then uses a 
systematic review of evaluation reports (see 
Appendices A and B for a list of reports covered 
and interviews conducted) and key informant 
interviews to see the extent to which current 
practice is congruent with the popular theoretical 
descriptions of RTE. By looking at the reports of 
practical application of RTE in humanitarian 
action, the study demystifies the approach and 
takes stock of its strengths and weaknesses. 
Finally, we suggest in what situations real-time 
evaluation makes most sense and how it could be 
improved. 
We argue that in order to improve the 
practical benefit of real-time evaluation, 
humanitarian organizations need to be even more 
selective and modest in its use. Wherever real-time 
evaluation is used – it should prioritize 
endogenous learning in organizations over 
questions of accountability and control. 
Method	  
 
The study is based on a meta-evaluation of 44 RTE 
reports. A caveat is in order here: We used 
purposive sampling to select publicly accessible 
evaluation reports from influential aid agencies. 
While our sample is thus not representative of the 
whole population of real-time evaluations ever 
conducted, it shows major trends among key aid 
actors. Compared to other domains of evaluation, 
methodological standards appear more modest in 
the humanitarian context. This meta-evaluation 
did therefore not entail all the standard quality 
criteria, but is a somewhat more basic assessment 
of evaluation practice compared to the promises of 
the Real-Time evaluation approach. While the 
analysis thus falls short of extensive meta-
evaluations as demonstrated by other authors 
(Scriven, 1969, 2008; Daniel Stufflebeam, 2001), it 
aims to provide an objective but realistic 
assessment through a number of criteria derived 
from the description of RTE (see chapter 3), as 
illustrated in Table 1. To assess the congruence of 
RTE practice with formal definitions and 
approaches described by major stakeholders, we 
thus looked at formal aspects, management 
aspects, the methods applied, the content and 
scope of RTE and whether reports identified 
general lessons or showed “good practice” worth 
highlighting. 
RTE is arguably more about the monitoring 
and evaluation process than about the final report. 
We thus supplemented our desk review with seven 
expert interviews that have experienced this 
process and could speak to how RTE is used in 
specific organizations, the role of RTE in their 
broader evaluation policy and the experience with 
the approach so far. We used purposive sampling 
to include aid practitioners and third parties 
(consultants) with experience in real-time 
evaluations. Our assessment is additionally 
informed by practical evaluation experience of the 
authors.  
 
	   	  









Formal	  aspects	   • Organization	  
• Sector	  and	  country	  
• Point	  of	  time	  in	  project	  cycle	  
• Duration	  of	  RTE	  
Management	   • Trigger	  for	  RTE	  
• Team	  composition	  
• Communication	  of	  results	  
• Follow-­‐up	  mechanism	  
Methodology	  	   • Sampling	  and	  data	  collection	  	  
• Use	  of	  technology	  
• Participation	  of	  beneficiaries	  
• Design	  option	  
Content	  and	  
scope	  
• Objectives	  and	  rationale	  
• Use	  of	  evaluation	  criteria	  (e.g.	  
DAC,	  n.d.)	  
 
The	  RTE	  Approach,	  Relevant	  Trends	  
and	  Theory	  
 
In some shape or form, the concept of RTE has 
likely been around for more than two decades (see, 
for example, Hobday (1988)). Its breakthrough in 
the humanitarian sector is largely attributed to the 
United Nations Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) initial 
proposal of something akin to RTE in 1992 during 
an evaluation of its response to the Persian Gulf 
crisis (Crisp, Martin, & Prattley, 1992). In 
subsequent documents, UNHCR summarized the 
perceived advantages of RTE in three words: (a) 
timeliness, (b) perspective and (c) interactivity 
(Jamal & Crisp, 2002). Having conducted RTE in 
more than 10 countries in the past decade, 
UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit 
(EPAU) has pushed and shaped the methodology 
considerably. For example, UNHCR has conducted 
RTE in the Sudan-Eritrea emergency (2000), 
Angola (2000), or Afghanistan/Iran (2002). More 
recently, a multi-country review of the cluster 
approach in Chad, DRC, Uganda, Somalia, Liberia 
(2007), and Sri Lanka (2010) was completed 
under UNHCR’s lead. 
Today, the term is used in the evaluation 
policies and guidelines of many humanitarian and 
development organizations. As Table 2 illustrates, 
the definitions held by other major humanitarian 
and development organizations largely agree on 
the same advantages. Oxfam, CARE and other 
NGOs have all adapted very similar definitions 
(OXFAM, n.d.). An apparent difference lies in the 
inclusion of impacts in the original UNHCR 
definition. 
RTE approaches thus have to cater to great 
expectations and tend to be described as an all-in-
one evaluation solution. A case in point is the 
description UN OCHA gives in their terms of 
reference: “The applied methods for IA RTE shall 
be light and participatory but rigorous as well” 
(UN OCHA, 2011, p. 3).  
Existing reviews (Herson & Mitchell, 2005; 
Sandison, 2003) agree on the following features of 
the RTE approach: 
 
• RTE usually takes place while 
implementation of the respective 
program is still going on, thus allowing 
immediate changes; 
• RTE is implemented in a fast and flexible 
way, typically taking only a few days 
instead of weeks; 
• The focus of RTE is on processes instead 
of outcomes or even impacts, sometimes 
with limited regard for standard 
evaluation criteria (e.g. DAC, ALNAP); 
• Ideally, more than one RTE is conducted 
in an iterative, on-going evaluation 
process to optimize respective programs; 
• Compared to classic ex-post or formative 
evaluations, internal staff has a much 
more important role to play also in the 
research design, with external consultants 
facilitating the process. 
 
International humanitarian bodies and 
networks, such as the Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action (ALNAP) and the UN Inter Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC), have refined the 
concept in their own guidance and adapted it to 
their work. According to the 2009 ALNAP guide 
for RTE (Cosgrave, Ramalingam, & Beck, 2009), 
what distinguishes real-time from regular 
evaluations is the timeframe and the audience of 
these studies. Contrary to “classical” evaluation 
studies, an RTE should deliver its findings before 
evaluation staff leave the field with the primary 
audience being the implementing agency’s staff. As 
far as the timeframe is concerned, RTE should 
“look at today to influence tomorrows planning” 
(p. 11). Methods suggested include key informant 
and beneficiary interviews, data analysis, 
observation and document review (p. 57). 
Finally, joint RTE involving a number of 
humanitarian actors have been piloted and  UN 
agencies active in humanitarian assistance 
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developed a set of operating procedures that 
specify criteria for triggering RTE, intended 
purpose and standard terms of reference (IA RTE 
Support Group, 2010). Inter-agency RTE are 
characterized by their shared management and 
methodological oversight through interagency 
reference and management groups. Again, 
expectations are high as guidance describes the 
approach as light, agile approaches, with restricted 
scope, and participatory methods, with staff of 
agencies responding to crisis in the respective 
countries as their main intended users (IA RTE 
Support Group, 2010, p. 5).  More recently, under 
its new “Transformative Agenda”, the Inter Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC), an inter-agency 
forum of UN and non-UN humanitarian 
organizations, has announced the development of 
Real-Time Operational Reviews. According to a 
IASC reference document (IASC, 2012, p. 5), “this 
will be based in part on the concept of the Real-
Time Evaluation (RTE), but place much greater 
emphasis on the validity of the strategic response 
plan and how the system is performing against 
agreed targets. The RTOR will focus on “why” any 
response targets are not being met, with 
corresponding immediate and medium term 
recommendations to overcome challenges.” It 
remains to be seen how these operational reviews 
will differ from existing RTEs in practice. 
 
Table	  2	  
Definitions	  of	  Real-­‐time	  Evaluation	  
	  
UNICEF	   UNHCR	   DG	  ECHO	  
“A	  Real-­‐time	  Evaluation	  is	  one	  
carried	  out	  whilst	  a	  programme	  
is	  in	  full	  implementation	  and	  
almost	  simultaneously	  feeds	  
back	  its	  findings	  to	  the	  
programme	  for	  immediate	  use.”	  
(Sandison,	  2003,	  p.	  8)	  
	  
“A	  Real-­‐time	  Evaluation	  (RTE)	  is	  a	  timely,	  
rapid	  and	  interactive	  peer	  review	  of	  a	  fast	  
evolving	  humanitarian	  operation,	  undertaken	  
at	  an	  early	  phase.	  (…)	  The	  broad	  purpose	  is	  to	  
gauge	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  impact	  of	  a	  given	  
UNHCR	  response,	  (usually	  in	  an	  emergency)	  
and	  to	  ensure	  that	  its	  findings	  are	  used	  as	  an	  
immediate	  catalyst	  for	  	  operational	  change.”	  
(Jamal	  &	  Crisp,	  2002,	  p.	  1)	  
“RTE	  is	  a	  very	  fast	  and	  timely	  
means	  of	  providing	  
evaluative	  feedback.	  It	  is	  
launched	  sufficiently	  early	  in	  
the	  course	  of	  a	  humanitarian	  
intervention	  to	  have	  an	  
effect	  on	  key	  decisions	  and	  
to	  assist	  in	  improving	  the	  
existing	  operation.”	  (DG	  
ECHO,	  2007,	  p.	  36)	  
 
Embedding	  RTE	  in	  Recent	  Organizational	  
Development	  and	  Evaluation	  Trends	  
 
The theoretical characteristics of RTE outlined 
above show that the main focus is on improving 
projects and programs as they are implemented. 
These features mirror three broader trends in 
evaluation and organizational development that 
have shaped evaluation practice and the 
expectation of humanitarian policymakers in past 
decades: an overall culture of urgency, the 
growing need for adaptive learning and increasing 
recognition of complexity. As we will see, these 
trends paved the way for RTE’s triumphal 
procession into evaluation practice today and go a 
long way in explaining its popularity. 
 
Evaluation	  Under	  Urgency	  and	  Resource	  
Constraints	  
 
In humanitarian assistance, evaluation had a fairly 
late start compared to development assistance and 
only really took-off after the traumatizing 
experience of collective failure in Rwanda in the 
mid-nineties. Donors (and implementers) have 
since then realized that the sector as such is more 
potent than ever before and that the risk of 
unintended harm requires greater scrutiny 
(Collinson & Elhawary, 2012). More funds and 
more competition among a growing number of 
humanitarian actors have also increased the 
pressure to demonstrate results, accountability 
and learning. A “culture of evaluation” in 
humanitarian assistance thus emerged, largely 
influenced by development evaluation (Crisp, 
2000). However, the sector showed a preference 
for less rigorous and shorter term methods, 
assuming that in the face of dramatic suffering and 
rapid need for action, one cannot afford to 
evaluate results of programs in great depth.  
The “culture of evaluation” thus met with a 
“culture of urgency” and quick, cheap, and useful 
methods had to be found to satisfy the emerging 
demand for accountability and to legitimate the 
resources allocated to humanitarian action. 
Increasing professionalization and more funds 
devoted to innovative ways of M&E set the stage 
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for RTE, which promised to satisfy the demand 
while respecting the limits of time and resources 
available. 
 
Evaluation	  to	  Facilitate	  Adaptive	  Learning	  
 
In the humanitarian sector, the pendulum has 
swung from accountability (especially “upwards” 
accountability towards donors) towards learning 
purposes of the evaluation activity. Hence, 
following the multi-agency evaluation of the 
international response to the Rwanda genocide in 
1997, the “Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action (ALNAP)” was established with the purpose 
to improve humanitarian performance through 
improving the quality and utilization of 
evaluations and supporting organizational and 
system-wide change. (In 2000, after the Kosovo 
crisis, ALNAP also developed the concept of field 
based “Learning Offices” that should allow 
organizations to share lessons and learn “in real 
time” as a crisis evolves. After a series of pilot 
studies, the concept was not further developed.) 
The growing demand for learning was fuelled 
and accompanied by frequent observations in the 
development and humanitarian sector that results 
from evaluations were not used for organizational 
change and that too many lessons came too late 
(Patton, 1997; Sandison, 2006; van de Putte, 2001; 
Weiss, 1977). Clark & Ramalingam (2008) point 
out that “[…] work on field-level learning has also 
shown that, despite good intentions and sound 
starting points, many initiatives focus on 
documents, systems and products, and so fail to 
support learning in operational contexts, which is 
generally a social, human and tacit process.”  
Evaluation was thus increasingly expected to 
provide a continuous stream of information that 
helps managers to reach effective decisions and 
improve programs in the long run (Patton, 2011; 
Stufflebeam, 1983). In other words, evaluation’s 
most important purpose was not seen to be 
proving, but improving (Stufflebeam, 2004). The 
evolving understanding is perhaps best illustrated 
by Patton’s “developmental evaluation”, which 
should help “[d]evelop a rapid response in the face 
of a sudden major change or a crisis, like a natural 
disaster or financial meltdown, exploring real-time 
solutions and generating helpful interventions for 
those in need” (p. 21). 
Despite all the emphasis on learning and use, a 
rather simplistic understanding of the learning 
subject (organizations) remained prevalent and 
the most frequent metaphor for organizations was 
still the machine (Clark & Ramalingam, 2008). So 
while use had become more important, the users 
(here: the actors in the humanitarian contexts) 
were still not fully understood. Like the logical 
program theories, evaluators expected evaluation 
to “cause” learning, when in fact evaluation 
influence is less direct and automatic and often 
depends on many different processes (Mark & 
Henry, 2004, p. 48). 
In the field of organizational development 
though, influential authors (C. Argyris, 1990; Chris 
Argyris & Schön, 1978; Schein, 1969; Senge, 2006; 
Weick, 1995) had long pointed to the limits of 
predicting organizational learning. They therefore 
developed approaches to facilitate organizational 
learning, which are informed by a constructivist 
world view (Lewin, 1946). 
Once these thoughts gained acceptance from 
managers and policymakers and organizations 
were increasingly seen as complex systems, change 
could not simply be “induced”, but needed to be 
“facilitated” through the participation of 
responsible stakeholders. Instead of expecting 
outsiders (i.e. external evaluators) to trigger a 
learning process through expert analysis and a 
long list of recommendations, organizations 
recognized the need to build internal evaluation 
and learning capacities. RTE, as described above, 
in theory incorporates these considerations and 
offers to enhance learning by organizations. 
Complexity and evaluation. Weaver (1948) 
already distinguished between simple phenomena 
which show predictable interactions of limited 
parts, complicated phenomena where multiple but 
stable parts interact, and organized complexity, 
where multiple parts interact in unpredictable, yet 
patterned ways. (Other similar categorizations and 
heuristics have been developed by (Ackoff, 1999) 
and others. (Mitchell, 2009) assumes about 40 
different measures of complexity are circulating in 
the literature.) Similarly, Snowden and colleagues 
stress that a situation is neither just simple nor 
complex, but that different aspects are found in 
every situation, requiring different decision 
strategies. Kurtz and Snowden (2003) thus 
distinguished between simple, complicated, 
complex and chaotic aspects of situations and 
corresponding decision making models. 
Needless to say, humanitarian assistance 
usually involves multiple actors who come 
together in dynamic crisis situations characterized 
by non-simple phenomena. The traditional view of 
evaluation as a rather static endeavour in which an 
agreed-upon theory of change and predefined 
indicators of success are analysed in a formative or 
summative manner was thus challenged in the 
humanitarian field as it was elsewhere (Patton, 
1997; White, 2009). Increasingly, practitioners 
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and scholars agree that this understanding of 
evaluation and corresponding practice is at odds 
with the complexities of working with social 
systems, and particularly humanitarian action. 
This trend is perhaps best illustrated by recent 
conferences on topics such as “Systemic 
Approaches in Evaluation” (GIZ 2011), “Navigating 
Complexity” (Wageningen 2008/09), “Evaluation 
in a Complex World” (EERS conference, 2012), or 
“Evaluation in Complex Ecologies” (AEA 2012). 
Hence, innovative evaluation approaches have 
to show they can address this complexity and are 
up for informing decision making and learning. 
Most evaluators agree that for learning and 
feedback loops in complex and uncertain 
environments to occur, the process of evaluation is 
more important than formal compliance with rigid 
logical frameworks (Ling, 2012; Pawson & Tilley, 
1997). 
Some 50 years after Weaver’s distinction, the 
rigid planning and requirement to demonstrate 
results in bureaucratic aid organizations shows 
that there is still a long way to go. Nevertheless, 
complexity-sensitive approaches to aid 
management and evaluation have experienced a 
rise and are more popular today than ever (Jones, 
2011; Ramalingam, Jones, Reba, & Young, 2008)..  
The RTE approach not only corresponds with 
these trends, but offers to bridge the seemingly 
contradictory demands for complexity-sensitive 
approaches that can foster adaptive learning in 
organizations, with a light footprint on the 
resources of donors and implementers – in real-
time. The remaining part of the paper will look at 
how the approach has lived up to these 
expectations in practice. 
 
How	  is	  RTE	  Applied	  in	  Practice?	  	  
 
To compare the theory of the RTE approach with 
its actual application in humanitarian 
organizations, we analyzed a sample of 44 publicly 
accessible RTE implemented between 2000 and 
2010 and documentation from nine large aid 
organizations. All but four reports were hence 
conducted after the last major desk review was 
undertaken by Sandison (2003). Table 3 provides 
an overview of the reports considered and 
countries covered in these evaluations. As noted 
above, we selected publicly accessible evaluation 
reports purposively to cover the work of influential 
aid agencies that arguably influence evaluation 
practice of the broader sector. We analyzed reports 
using a template that covered the assessment 
criteria described in Table 1 above. The full table 
used for this analysis is available from the authors.	  
	  
Table	  3	  
Overview	  of	  Reports	  Considered	  by	  Organization,	  Countries,	  and	  Regions	  
	  
Organization	   Countries	  and	  Regions	  Covered	   Number	  
CARE	   Sudan	   2	  
CRS	   Pakistan,	  Haiti	   3	  
DEC	   Pakistan	   1	  
DG	  ECHO	   Zimbabwe,	  Haiti	   2	  
FAO	   Global,	  Indonesia,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Thailand,	  Maldives	   3	  
HAP	   Afghanistan,	  Sierra	  Leone	   2	  
IASC	   Pakistan,	  The	  Philippines,	  Sudan,	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  Mozambique,	  Haiti	   10	  
IFRC	   Indonesia	   and	   Sri	   Lanka,	   Asia	   (India,	   Sri	   Lanka,	  Maldives)	   and	   East	   Africa	  
(Somalia,	  Seychelles)	  
2	  
Oxfam	   Zimbabwe,	  The	  Philippines,	  Laos,	  Cambodia,	  Indonesia	  	   4	  
Tearfund	   Haiti	   1	  
UNHCR	   Afghanistan,	  Angola,	  Chad,	  DRC,	  Liberia,	  Somalia,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Sudan,	  Eritrea,	  
Uganda	  
10	  
UNICEF	   Yemen,	  Georgia	   2	  
WFP	   Zambia,	  Zimbabwe,	  Swaziland,	  Mozambique,	  Malawi,	  Lesotho,	  India	  	   2	  
	   	   44	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The analysis shows that while theoretical 
definitions held by organizations are largely 
congruent, implementation of the concept varies 
considerably. Differences in timing, team 
composition and scope of the evaluation are most 
apparent. Clearly, the title “RTE” is used more 
broadly than its original conceptualization would 
justify. 
Regarding their position in the project life 
cycle, we see that RTE is not only used at the 
beginning of projects. While most were conducted 
in the early phases, i.e. 2-4 months into the 
response (13); many were conducted 5-6 months 
into response (6) or much later, 1-3 years in (7). 
Despite the aim to influence on-going 
programming and implement immediate changes, 
about one third of the RTE considered for this 
review have been implemented towards the end of 
programs. 
Frequently, timing was affected by delays in 
the recruitment of evaluation teams or the 
conceptualization of studies, despite plans to 
initiate the evaluation earlier. What was planned 
as a real-time exercise to influence on-going 
operations was sometimes implemented much 
later, leading to critique of “wrong time 
evaluations” (IASC Mozambique, 2007). In other 
cases, evaluation teams adjusted their focus 
accordingly, to then generate lessons for future 
endeavours. 
The analysis showed a large variation in 
duration, from one week to 1.5 years, with the 
majority taking between 4 and 15 weeks. Thus, 
most of the studies took longer than would be 
expected from the literature. (For example, while 
UNHCR completed very quick studies, FAO’s RTE 
went through a very long process of 1.5 years.) In 
many cases, the exact duration was not apparent 
from the reports, but it seems that only in 
exceptional cases did RTE “look at today to 
influence tomorrows planning,” as suggested in 
the ALNAP guide. 
Most organizations emphasized the demand 
for learning as the main motivation for an RTE. 
However, most combined the learning objective 
with expectations of accountability. In about 10% 
of the cases, the RTE was motivated by some 
inadequacy, negative feedback or failure. Other 
reasons given were the transformation to another 
phase, exceptionally large or complex 
interventions, or drastic changes in the project or 
emergency context. 
In terms of stated objectives, almost all RTE 
reports and available terms of references highlight 
the need for immediate feedback to improve on-
going operations and to feed into future 
programming and strategy. Objectives given are 
often broken down into concrete questions and 
cover a diverse and broad range of strategic and 
operational issues. In contrast to the narrow focus 
prescribed to RTE, evaluation questions 
formulated in terms of references addressed 
longer-term strategic issues of broad scope. 
Organizations show different strategies and 
expectations concerning team composition and 
responsibility for the evaluation process. CARE, 
FAO, Oxfam, UNHCR and WFP deployed teams of 
experts from their own organizations, sometimes 
drawing on selected additional support from 
external consultants. On the other hand, DG 
ECHO, IASC, IFRC, UNICEF, CRS, DEC relied on 
consultants to lead evaluation missions. Overall, 
the role of external consultants has in many cases 
been interpreted to go beyond that of a facilitator. 
Many organizations followed the familiar pattern 
of regular evaluations and expected mostly 
external advice from experts and evaluators. 
The degree to which recommendations from 
RTE reports have been implemented cannot be 
judged from our desk review. However, some 
noteworthy examples included a follow-up 
workshop some months after completion of the 
evaluation (UNICEF, 2010) and publicised 
reactions to recommendations and management-
response matrices (FAO, 2010b). Similarly, IASC 
(2006) and IFRC (2005a, b) included matrices in 
their reports or attached in separate documents. 
Usually, organizations held debriefings or 
workshops with key stakeholders from country 
offices and headquarters to feedback results and 
discuss emerging findings. 
With the notable exception of the IASC RTE of 
the 2007 response in Mozambique, reports did not 
go into much detail when describing the methods 
applied. (As one interviewee pointed out, 
commissioning organizations sometimes even 
explicitly ask to cut “boring methodology sections” 
to produce short reports.) Sampling was generally 
done on an ad-hoc basis. Evaluators then mostly 
relied on paper and pencil, conducting individual, 
group and (telephone) interviews. Beyond 
telephone and email, teams did not make use of 
technology to collect data. 
As for the design option applied, evaluation 
reports remained very vague in their description of 
the exact design chosen. Virtually none showed 
efforts to randomize sampling or apply (quasi-) 
experimental research setups. 
More than two-thirds of RTE considered made 
some effort to include the perspective of 
beneficiaries. Anything from a dozen (UNICEF 
Georgia, 2009) to several hundred (IASC 
Mozambique, 2007) beneficiaries were included in 
analyses. Beneficiary feedback was largely seen to 
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complete other perspectives, but was never an 
explicit focus. Documentation of where, when and 
how beneficiaries were included (e.g. through 
group or individual interviews, surveys or 
workshops) or how samples have been selected 
was either missing or incomplete in all but two 
reports (IASC Mozambique, 2007; IASC Haiti, 
2010). 
About one third of the reports considered 
mention DAC criteria for evaluation, but only 
selected criteria are then applied. Less frequently, 
Sphere standards, minimum standards in core 
areas of humanitarian assistance, are addressed 
(ECHO, 2007; IASC, 2007; IFRC 2005a) or 
reference to UNEG standards of evaluation (IASC, 
2010; UNICEF, 2009) or ALNAP guidelines (DG 
ECHO, 2007; IASC, 2010) is made.  
 
Summary	  of	  Results	  
 
The analysis shows that the practice of RTE 
diverges from the theoretical characterizations 
frequently described. The main differences are: 
 
• Organizations use RTE for more than the 
specific niche they were intended for; 
• They expect RTE to consider results and 
impacts, going beyond the narrower scope 
on processes; 
• Humanitarian actors apply RTE along all 
phases of the project life cycle, not just at 
the beginning of projects; 
• The time required to conduct an RTE is 
longer than expected in the literature; 
• Evaluators are still expected to provide 
external expert advice on operational 
issues; 
• Humanitarian organizations use RTE for 
accountability purposes as well as to 
facilitate learning. 
 
This shows a current practice where RTE are not 
used to their full potential, and in some cases even 
misused for less adequate purposes. 
Most significantly, an imbalance is evident 
between the light and agile setup theoretically 
described and the comprehensive questions major 
organizations pose in their terms of reference. The 
scope is frequently extremely broad, including 
wish lists of interesting aspects of an intervention 
from sector-relevant results to longer-term impact. 
This is problematic for at least two reasons: 
First, RTE is not able to provide solid analysis 
about results and impact with the simplified and 
quick set-up they usually entail. The knowledge 
they generate is neither as reliable nor as valid as 
the findings generated by regular evaluations or 
impact studies with more elaborate designs. 
Moreover, findings from RTE cannot be 
generalized beyond a fairly specific context. 
Second, being the more affordable option, they 
can crowd out full-fledged evaluation efforts, 
weakening the overall evaluation system in 
humanitarian assistance instead of merely 
supplementing it with a more agile approach. 
But even if done correctly in accordance with 
the theoretical descriptions of the approach, RTE 
has its limits. Accepting these limits would lead to 
a more modest – and less formal approach. RTE 
should thus be seen as a helpful approach for 
organizational innovation and learning in complex 
environments rather than a (humanitarian aid) 
evaluation methodology. Thus, the application of 
RTE needs a number of corrections and the 
development of future real-time evaluative 
approaches could benefit from the following 
suggestions. 
 
How	  Could	  RTE	  be	  More	  Useful?	  
 
1.	  Place	  Them	  in	  the	  Right	  Context	  and	  Accept	  
The	  Limits	  
 
In light of extensive praise from existing (grey) 
literature and guidelines, the limits of RTE should 
not be overlooked. RTE does not provide an all-in-
one solution, but is intended for a specific niche 
and potentially harmful if used for other purposes. 
Its agile and economic character comes at a price 
in rigor and depth. While rigor does not have to 
entail complicated methods or necessarily depends 
on set quality standards, it does take time and will 
slow down the evaluation process (Zelik, 
Patterson, & Woods, 2010).  
The goal should be to help decision makers 
understand the situation they attempt to influence. 
RTE can help to learn more about how 
humanitarian action influences a specific context 
and vice versa, when original plans clash with 
reality. To find general lessons for all 
organizations and contexts, other approaches 
remain more expensive, but also more feasible.  
Moreover, the context needs to be right. RTE 
is most appropriate in “complex” situations (cf. 
Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). In such contexts, staff in 
organizations cannot rely on their pre-determined 
plans to guide decision making, but will have to 
take action based on the limited information they 
have, sense available options and try new 
approaches. RTE can add value in providing staff 
of humanitarian organizations with the proper 
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tools for “sensing” how the initial probing or acting 
works out in practice and what it means for the 
evolving response. RTE, done right, can thus 
“support informed adaptation by practitioners” 
before it is too late for the necessary changes 
(Ling, 2012, p. 84).  
 
2.	  Do	  Not	  Use	  RTE	  to	  Scrutinize	  Implementing	  
Organizations	  
 
In line with the limitations highlighted above, RTE 
should not be applied where concerns about 
accountability to donors outweigh or compromise 
learning purposes. For donors to judge whether 
their funds have been put to good use, longer-term 
standard evaluation with an external control 
function should remain the mechanism of choice. 
RTE, on the other hand, adds most value in a 
trusting and flexible environment, where mistakes 
can be used as opportunities to optimize processes 
before it is too late.  
Donors need to accept the uncertainty and 
risks involved in evolving humanitarian action and 
encourage their partners to exploit all means to 
make sense of the complex situations they are in. 
They should clearly differentiate between internal 
learning mechanisms such as RTE and 
accountability or control-oriented evaluations that 
focus on results. The most important type of 
accountability that should be fostered along the 
way and to which the findings of RTE can 
contribute, is the accountability for learning. In 
other words, donors should encourage 
implementing organizations to set up effective 
internal learning mechanisms and to allow 
affected populations to influence programming as 
it develops (cf. point 4). They should not, however, 
compromise the learning environment by micro-
evaluating processes in real time. As a 
consequence – and contrary to standard 
evaluations – the results from RTE should not 
automatically be made public, but rather used to 
their fullest inside the organization. 
 
3.	  Use	  Them	  as	  an	  In-­‐House	  Tool	  for	  
Organizational	  Development	  and	  Learning	  
With	  Staff	  on	  The	  Ground	  
 
As Eggers (2006) points out, planning and 
evaluation are two sides of the same coin. Today’s 
RTE needs to be able to influence tomorrow’s 
planning. To achieve this, the organizational setup 
needs to be adjusted accordingly. For example, 
organizations could involve staff that is 
responsible for planning in RTE and should not 
only delegate responsibility to outside experts. As 
Scharmer (2009) has emphasized, we need to put 
together insights from organizational learning, 
action inquiry, multi-stakeholder learning 
processes and product innovation (design 
thinking) to address what seems to be common 
sense by now, that most of society’s toughest 
problems are not owned by any one person or 
institution. This means we need to carefully 
involve other perspectives than the usual in an 
ongoing RTE. In most crisis contexts, numerous 
humanitarian organizations are involved and 
jointly produce a result that cannot be attributed 
to the sum of their individual action. Hence, Inter-
Agency approaches seem to present a valuable 
approach that could be applied increasingly by 
NGO consortia or NGO fora. Perspectives that 
could be included in drafting terms and 
informing/managing the RTE process include 
internal experts, planning staff, local stakeholders 
such as religious leaders or community authorities 
as well as – where possible and feasible – relevant 
sector experts from the affected communities or 
local organizations. Where their personal 
participation is not feasible, their perspective 
should be included through consultation during 
the early stages of an RTE and at critical points in 
the evaluation process. 
Inflexible adherence to pre-planned Logical 
Framework tables and an overly rigid application 
of Project Cycle Management tools, on the other 
hand, may inhibit adaptive changes. Teams on the 
ground would be better equipped with a process 
that allowed constant and on the spot feedback by 
external facilitators (be they in-house or 
consultants).  
 
4.	  Trigger	  Them	  by	  Demand	  Only	  
 
RTE needs to be demand-driven by responsible 
stakeholders who are willing to learn and to take 
action based on the findings (McNall & Foster-
Fishman, 2007). Automatic triggering as foreseen 
for IA-RTE is thus not the right option, because it 
is blind to demand and potential for change. 
Rather, those targeted need to be able and willing 
to learn and change, i.e. there needs to be room for 
improvement and sufficient authority, as well as 
sufficient flexibility in the overall program setup. 
Hence, early agreement between leadership and 
staff on the possibility to do an RTE is essential, so 
it can then be realized quickly when the need 
arises.  
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5.	  Harness	  Relevant	  Feedback	  from	  Outside	  
the	  Organization	  
 
Finally, while being an internally-controlled 
process, RTE should harness relevant feedback 
from outside their organizations, i.e. from those 
targeted by their action (beneficiaries) but also 
from outside their target group. However, 
requesting implementation partners to conduct 
beneficiary surveys can create a conflict of interest 
and they may chose not to feed back 
compromising information (FAO, 2007: 57). 
Again, an explicit organizational learning focus is 
vital to allow for the necessary openness. To 
facilitate efficient collection and processing of 
data, new technological solutions to gather 
beneficiary feedback have become available since 
the early phases of Real-time Evaluation (cf. UN 
Global Pulse Initiative, n.d.). Their use could 
facilitate quick and direct feedback from affected 
populations and narrow the information gap 
between implementers and recipients of services 
in real-time, allowing RTE to make on-going 




We have seen that the RTE approach promises to 
meet considerable demand in the humanitarian 
sector. Its application in practice, however, is more 
varied than standard definitions suggest. Given 
their seemingly simple and cost-saving nature, the 
risk of misappropriate use and crowding out of 
more rigorous evaluations is significant. The 
approach should thus be reserved for the narrow 
niche it was intended and be implemented with an 
explicit learning focus. Based on an analysis of 
current practice, we suggested ways to optimize 
RTE use in humanitarian assistance. Future 
research will have to show whether these options 
are reasonable in terms of allocated time and 
resources and whether humanitarian 
organizations will be able to actually use results in 
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